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A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
(IN)ACTION

TO

AGENCY

Lidiya Mishchenko*

ABSTRACT
In the last five years, the Supreme Court has had a frenzied approach to
judicial review of agency action, with two wings of the Court pulling it in
opposite directions. The ideological divide of the Court on deference to
agency action was on stark display in three recent cases dealing with the
Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO’s) new proceeding for reevaluating
issued patents (inter partes review (IPR)). Specifically, in three vacillating
opinions, the Court expanded, contracted, and then again expanded the
scope of whether and to what extent a decision by the PTO Director to
institute this new proceeding can be reviewed by the Judiciary. Aside from
the problem of having inconsistent holdings in this “institution trio” of
cases, the framework developed thereby was also artificial, easily manipulated, and unmoored from reality. The Court got everything completely
backwards in its reasoning—depriving the agency of discretion in allocating its own resources or relying on its superior expertise when the agency
refused to institute an IPR proceeding (i.e., an institution denial), while
tying the hands of the Judiciary in deciding questions of an agency’s authority to act when the agency chose to grant review.
This Article argues that the Court should have instead decided the question of reviewability by focusing on the pragmatic approach proposed in
Heckler v. Chaney, respecting the traditional administrative law divide between agency action and inaction. The Court should have considered, as it
did in Heckler, congressional intent, comparative institutional competence
of the agency versus the courts, and the separation of powers paradigm in
deciding to review agency action and inaction. The more sensible answer is
that the courts should only be prohibited from reviewing agency inaction
(i.e., denial of IPR institution). This approach allows the PTO to best use
its expertise and knowledge of its resources to decide whether and to what
extent to deny institution of an IPR, while allowing the courts to review the
PTO’s adherence to statutory requirements if the PTO does decide to institute an IPR.
The approach also presents a variety of pragmatic benefits, such as eliminating the institution trio’s line-drawing issues, reducing current agency
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke Law School. For helpful comments and discussion, I thank Joseph Blocher, Robert L. Glicksman, Dmitry Karshtedt, Margaret H. Lemos, Arti Rai, and David Simon.
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incentives for developing shortcuts in denying institution, and providing a
better balance of institutional burdens. This Article introduces an intriguing proposition that a more functional approach to agency action may, in
other contexts, provide a potential compromise that satisfies both sides of
the ideological divide in the Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION

W

ITH recent and dramatic changes in its composition, the Supreme Court is confronting an internal, often partisan struggle
over its views of the legitimacy and role of the administrative
state. The Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO’s) new procedure for reviewing granted patents (entitled inter partes review (IPR)), has been
caught in the crosshairs. Since 2017, the Court has repeatedly used this
new forum—administered by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB
or “the Board”)—as a test case to make profound changes in areas of
administrative law such as the public-rights doctrine,1 Chevron defer1. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018).
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ence,2 and the Appointments Clause.3 Often, in the heat of this struggle,
the Court has ignored, or has only paid lip service to, the specifics of how
the PTO operates or the congressional intent behind creating this new
forum. A set of three cases I dub the “institution trio” demonstrates the
havoc that results from ignoring realities on the ground and consistently
targeting a specific agency to resolve abstract disputes about the appropriate role of the Judiciary in policing the administrative state.
The institution trio, consisting of Cuozzo,4 SAS,5 and Thryv,6 dealt
with the question of whether and to what extent a decision by the PTO
Director to institute an IPR proceeding can be reviewed by the Judiciary,
in view of the nonappealability provision in the relevant provision of the
statute.7 In the ideologically-divided and polarized environment of the
current Court, this question became a critical nexus for how much unreviewable discretion an agency can legitimately possess.
In the institution trio, the Court resolved the question exactly backwards. In the course of the tug-and-pull of these three decisions, the
Court deprived the agency of discretion in allocating its own resources or
relying on its superior expertise in denying institution while tying the
hands of the Judiciary in deciding questions of an agency’s authority to
act. The institution trio claimed to consider Congressional intent, agency
expertise, and statutory structure, but reached completely illogical results—depriving both the agency and the Judiciary of their respective authority where Congress likely wanted it most.
I argue that the Court should have instead decided the institution review question by focusing on the traditional administrative law divide between agency action and inaction. It should have interpreted the
nonappealability provision, for all legally significant purposes, as prohibiting judicial review only of agency inaction (i.e., denial of IPR institution). The textual statutory analysis and legislative intent leave open the
possibility that Congress intended this outcome. Consideration of the
Heckler8 doctrine, moreover, strongly supports this reading. Heckler instructs the Court to consider congressional intent, comparative institutional competence of the agency versus the courts, and the separation of
powers in deciding to review agency action and inaction.9
The Heckler approach allows the PTO to best use its expertise and
knowledge of its resources to decide whether and to what extent to deny
institution of an IPR, while allowing the courts to review the PTO’s adherence to statutory requirements if the PTO does decide to institute re2. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
3. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141. S. Ct. 1970, 1978–86 (2021).
4. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2136.
5. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352–53 (2018).
6. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2020).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (“The determination by the Director whether to institute an
inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”).
8. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
9. Id. at 831–33.
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view. The approach also presents a variety of pragmatic benefits, such as
eliminating the line-drawing issues inherent in the institution trio’s framework, reducing current agency incentives for excessive denial of institution, and providing a better balance of institutional burdens. In addition,
the focus on certain functional and pragmatic considerations, even beyond the action/inaction dichotomy of Heckler, may help the Court reach
a compromise in administrative law decisions in other contexts.
Part I provides a brief background of the new IPR proceeding, its statutory background, and the appeal procedures in place. It then summarizes the framework that the institution trio set up for IPR institution and
the appeal thereof. Part II examines the problem with this framework,
and Part III introduces a new approach to review of IPR institution. Specifically, Part III explores the insight we can glean from the statute and
legislative history, before diving into the functional approach advocated
by the Heckler doctrine. Part IV evaluates the real-world benefits of this
approach and discusses some of its limitations and broader implications.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTER PARTES REVIEW
In 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act10
(AIA), which created a new set of proceedings for challenging patents
issued by the PTO.11 These proceedings were meant to create a cheaper,
faster alternative to challenging patent validity in district court.12 The
most popular of these proceedings is IPR.13
A party initiates an IPR by filing a petition for review of a granted
patent, challenging specific claims—or inventions—in that patent.14 IPR
petitions cannot be filed more than one year after that same or related
party challenges that same patent in district court (the “one-year bar”).15
After the patent owner has had a chance to respond to the petition,16
the PTO Director is tasked with deciding whether to institute review.17
The Director cannot institute review “unless the Director determines that
. . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition” (the
“threshold inquiry”).18 In practice, the Director has delegated this deci10. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319, 321–329) (post grant review proceedings).
11. See id. § 6.
12. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (discussing “the purpose of the [postgrant review proceeding statute] as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to
litigation”).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 311; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS: FY20
END OF YEAR OUTCOME ROUNDUP IPR, PGR, CBM 5 (2020), https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/ptab_aia_fy2020_roundup.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAU5-F7EB].
14. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2020) (defining “petition”); id. § 42.104.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
16. Id. § 313.
17. Id. § 314(b).
18. Id. § 314(a).
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sion to the Board.19 And, key to the discussion here, “[t]he determination
by the Director [or, in reality, the Board, of] whether to institute an inter
partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”20 This
nonappealability provision language is the focal point in the controversy
of the institution trio cases described below.
If an IPR is instituted, the parties participate in a court-like proceeding
before a panel of PTAB administrative judges.21 The proceeding includes
briefing, motion practice, oral argument, and discovery.22 In the end, barring any settlement, the Board “issue[s] a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the
petitioner.”23 The Board’s final decision can be appealed directly to the
Federal Circuit.24
B. THE “INSTITUTION TRIO”
The first case dealing with appealability of the Director’s institution
decision was Cuozzo. In 2012, Garmin International, Inc. and Garmin
USA, Inc. (collectively Garmin) filed a petition seeking IPR of twenty
claims of a patent owned by Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC.25 The
Board instituted review on a number of claims that were “implicitly”
challenged by Garmin’s petition and found them to be invalid. 26 Cuozzo
appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that Garmin’s petition did not
specify “with particularity” the grounds to invalidate the implicitly challenged claims, as required by statute.27
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit sided with Garmin and decided
that the Board’s choice to institute despite a statutory defect in the petition was unappealable.28 A split Supreme Court agreed, concluding that
“where a patent holder grounds its claim in a statute closely related to
[the] decision to institute inter partes review, [the nonappealability provision] bars judicial review.”29 Cuozzo left open the possibility that certain
issues related to institution may still be appealable, including constitutional “shenanigans” such as due process violations or the “agency . . .
act[ing] outside its statutory limits.”30 Six Justices on both sides of the
conservative/liberal ideological spectrum signed on to this opinion, with
19. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2020).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d).
21. 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2020) (defining “Board”).
22. See id. §§ 42.22, 42.51, 42.70.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
24. Id. §§ 141, 144, 319.
25. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2138 (2016).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2139; 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3).
28. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139.
29. Id. at 2142; see also id. at 2141 (“[O]ur interpretation applies where the grounds
for attacking the decision to institute inter partes review consist of questions that are
closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office’s
decision to initiate inter partes review.”).
30. Id. at 2141–42.
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only Justices Alito and Sotomayor dissenting. 31
Two years later, the Supreme Court had the chance to revisit the
nonappealability provision and seemed to reach an almost opposite conclusion. SAS Institute, Inc. petitioned for review of a software patent
owned by ComplementSoft, LLC.32 The PTO instituted review on only a
portion of the claims challenged by SAS in the petition (those that met
the reasonable likelihood threshold), 33 and thus, only issued a final written decision on that subset of instituted claims.34 SAS argued that the
Board was required to address every claim in its original petition because
the statute requires the Board to “issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.”35 The Federal Circuit disagreed.36
In SAS, unlike in Cuozzo, the Court split completely along ideological
conservative/liberal lines.37 The conservative Justices favored judicial review and the liberal Justices opposed it.38 The conservatives, with Justice
Gorsuch authoring, found that the PTO exceeded its statutory duty by
not “address[ing] in its final written decision ‘any patent claim challenged
by the petitioner.’”39 In effect, the majority decided that the nonappealability provision did not prohibit its review of the PTO’s actions.40 It reasoned that, under Cuozzo, the nonappealability provision only prohibited
review of the Director’s reasonable likelihood threshold inquiry, which is
contained in the same section of the statute.41 The liberal Justices criticized the majority’s “wooden reading” of the statute42 and argued that
the agency’s interpretation of its power to partially institute review was
reasonable and deserved deference.43 Oddly, the liberal Justices did not
cite Cuozzo to support the government’s partial institution practice.
The tension between Cuozzo and SAS came to a head in Thryv. Thryv,
Inc. (Thryv) petitioned for review of a patent owned by Click-to-Call
Technologies, LP (Click).44 Click opposed the IPR, contending that the
petition was filed past the one-year bar based on a lawsuit filed by
Thryv’s predecessor that was dismissed without prejudice.45 The PTAB
31. Id. at 2148 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018).
33. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,680, 48,702–03 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (discussing the
threshold).
34. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1354.
35. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)) (emphasis added in the SAS opinion).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1360–65 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
38. See id. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1364 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1357 (majority opinion) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)).
40. Id. at 1360 (“[N]othing in § 314(d) or Cuozzo withdraws our power to ensure that
an inter partes review proceeds in accordance with the law’s demands.”).
41. Id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), (d).
42. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2020).
45. Id. at 1371 n.2.

2022]

Functional Approach to Agency (In)Action

123

ruled that this lawsuit did not trigger the statutory clock and instituted
review.46 Different panels of the Federal Circuit split on this issue based
on conflicting readings of Cuozzo.47 Seven members of the Supreme
Court (spanning the ideological spectrum) ruled that Cuozzo clearly resolved this question and that the PTO’s institution of the case was unreviewable.48 This same bipartisan group of Justices chose to narrow the
holding in SAS, characterizing that case as dealing with “the manner in
which the agency’s review ‘proceeds’ once instituted” instead of “whether
the agency should have instituted review at all,” as was the case in
Cuozzo and Thryv.49 Thryv also conspicuously dropped the “shenanigans” language mentioned in Cuozzo, though still claiming that “appeals
that implicate constitutional questions” may still be reviewable despite
the nonappealability provision in the statute.50
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE INSTITUTION TRIO
The above summary of these three cases highlights their inconsistencies
and reflects deep divisions within the Court. Empirical studies confirm
that decisions in administrative law can sometimes be influenced more by
the ideological leaning of a Justice and the liberal/conservative valence of
an agency decision than any doctrinal framework of the case (e.g., reviewability, deference).51 Though most studies focus on the deference
awarded to agencies, it is expected that similar ideological hues would
color decisions of reviewability of agency action or inaction. As highlighted by Lisa Bressman, the Supreme Court has noted the connection
between the deference and reviewability doctrines in cases that emphasize institutional competence.52 After all, both doctrines “reflect the notion that agencies . . . , not courts, should set priorities in the statutes
those agencies implement.”53
Although it is still difficult to classify the administrative law perspectives of all the current Justices, and ideological valence tends to have reduced influence on patent law decisions,54 two distinct groups in the
46. Id. at 1371–72.
47. Id. at 1372.
48. Id. at 1369, 1372–74.
49. Id. at 1376.
50. Id. at 1373 (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141
(2016)).
51. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (“[T]he most
conservative members of the Court are less likely to validate liberal agency interpretations
than conservative ones, and the least conservative members of the Court show the opposite
pattern.”).
52. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1679 (2004) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
831–32 (1985)); id. at 1681 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601, 603–04 (1988)).
53. Id. at 1679.
54. See Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in
Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 804 (2009) (“We therefore conclude that although ideology is an important element in predicting IP decisions,
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Supreme Court can be identified. A new conservative faction of the
Court, often championed by Justice Gorsuch but frequently joined by Justice Alito, is highly skeptical of administrative agencies.55 While current
“conservative judges are [generally] more likely than liberal judges to be
administrative state skeptics,”56 Justice Gorsuch has been particularly vocal about his distrust of the administrative state as a whole, and of IPR
proceedings in particular.57 Meanwhile, at the other extreme, a liberal
faction led by Justices Kagan and Breyer, and often joined by the late
Justice Ginsburg in her final years on the bench, has historically pressed
for a highly deferential approach to agency expertise.58 Even Justice
Breyer, who has been a vocal critic of at least one doctrinal form of judicial deference to agency action, is still “the most deferential justice in
practice.”59 In fact, empirical studies show that the decisions of both Justice Breyer and the late Justice Ginsburg are highly influenced by the
ideological and political implications of the agency actions at issue.60
The other Justices, such as Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Sotomayor, and sometimes even Justice Alito, have been less predictable on administrative law issues.61 The less predictable conservative
Justices are more likely swayed by purely textualist arguments,62 while
Justice Sotomayor appears to have a strong doctrinal preference for judithere may nonetheless be real differences between the effect of ideology in social and
economic cases.”).
55. Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2019); id. at 6 (“Justice Gorsuch emerged as the voice of the four more conservative Justices this Term, intent on overturning established administrative law doctrines
and pulling back on administrative government.”).
56. Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599, 1622 (2018).
57. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1381 (2018) (“[W]hen an independent Judiciary gives ground to bureaucrats in the
adjudication of cases, the losers will often prove the unpopular and vulnerable[.] Powerful
interests are capable of amassing armies of lobbyists and lawyers to influence (and even
capture) politically accountable bureaucracies. But what about everyone else?”).
58. Metzger, supra note 55, at 5–6 (“Meanwhile Justice Kagan led the four liberal
Justices in a defensive effort, seeking to deter or at least mitigate the conservative
assault.”).
59. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 826.
60. Id. at 833 (“The validation rates of Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg move by
more than [twenty] percentage points when the [political] nature of the agency decision
changes.”).
61. Metzger, supra note 55, at 6 (“In the middle was Chief Justice Roberts, sharing the
conservatives’ suspicion of government and bureaucracy yet resistant to the dramatic disruption and potential institutional costs to the Court that Gorsuch’s approach might
yield.”); id. at 30–31 (discussing confusion about Justice Thomas’s views); Thomas M.
Hardiman, Judicial Independence and the Roberts Court, 2019–2020 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
15, 27 (2020) (“In a patent case, Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, Justice Sotomayor
broke ranks from Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan to author an opinion for the Court
holding that the federal government is not a ‘person’ capable of petitioning the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board to institute patent review proceedings.” (citing Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1859 (2019))); see, e.g., Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP,
140 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2020) (Alito, J., joining the majority).
62. Metzger, supra note 55, at 54 (“The Roberts Court is often described as textualist
in its approach to statutory interpretation, including by the Justices themselves.”).
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cial review that guides her decision-making.63 Consequently, although opposing ideological poles have started to form in the new Roberts Court
with respect to administrative law, recent decisions have not broken
neatly along the conservative/liberal divide due to this less predictable
group of Justices.
Cuozzo, penned by Justice Breyer, reflects a win for the pro-administrative wing in the Court. It provided great deference64 to the agency by
drawing a vague area around what is not judicially reviewable, prohibiting review of issues “closely related” to the decision to institute.65 Yet the
case also left open an equally confusing description of exceptions to its
rule under the umbrella term of constitutional “shenanigans.”66 Likely,
the vagueness was a way to reach greater consensus within the Court. It
also appears to be a result of an incomplete attempt to divine congressional intent from a sparse legislative history, with the holding based on
the broad congressional goal of “giving the Patent Office significant
power to revisit and revise earlier patent grants.”67 And ultimately, even
though the Cuozzo opinion attempted to look to pragmatic considerations such as agency expertise and legislative history,68 and seemed to
reach an ostensibly harmless result of allowing the agency to sweep minor
statutory defects under the rug, the amount of unreviewable discretion it
granted to the PTO proved too much.
By prohibiting judicial review of agency action that contradicted statutory requirements (i.e., the specificity requirement for petitions), Cuozzo
may have left the more conservative members of the Court uncomfortable with the scope of the PTO’s unreviewable discretion. Or perhaps pure
textualism won the day for some. Either way, in SAS, those Justices—
with Justice Gorsuch at the helm—attempted to arbitrarily narrow that
discretion to the Director’s reasonable likelihood threshold inquiry.69
The holding in SAS did not survive the test of time. Two years later,
four of the conservative Justices with less predictable views on administrative law—Thomas, Alito, Roberts, and Kavanaugh—were swayed
once more to the other, more deferential extreme of the Court in Thryv
(perhaps, again, in part, by textual arguments). Thryv re-broadened
Cuozzo to its “closely related” language and even ignored part of its narrowing “shenanigans” language.70
63. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2150 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Sotomayor, J., joining) (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v.
EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015)) (defending the “‘strong presumption’ favoring judicial
review of administrative action”).
64. I use this word colloquially, not in reference to the doctrine of judicial deference in
administrative law, though I do argue that there is a connection between the doctrines of
reviewability and deference. See supra text accompanying notes 52–53.
65. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142.
66. Id. at 2141–42.
67. Id. at 2139–40.
68. Id. at 2141, 2146.
69. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).
70. See Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1370, 1373 (2020); id. at
1385–86 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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The doctrinal confusion stemming from these inconsistent holdings is
only part of the problem, however. The real problem is the results-oriented way in which the Court reached the holdings in SAS and Thryv in
response to the overbroad holding in Cuozzo, and the practical outcomes
of these cases. While the reasons behind the flip-flopping by the majority
of the Court are not as easy to explain, the authors of the institution trio
opinions represent the two extremes of the Justices’ views of administrative law. The opinions are not just the result of doctrinal or textual differences at issue in the cases but are likely tinged with the ideological
leanings of their authors. The inconsistencies between SAS and Thryv
thus likely reflect a broader internal battle in the Court over the appropriate role of the Judiciary in reviewing agency action, with the pro-administrative wing aiming to reduce the scope of reviewable agency action,
and the anti-administrative wing attempting to expand it. In the heat of
battle, the authoring Justices may have lost sight of the effect of their
rulings on the agency. The repeated targeting of the PTO in the Court’s
attempt to resolve this battle has left the agency in a contorted mess of
contradictory rulings.
In an effort to narrow Cuozzo, the SAS majority (or at the very least,
Justice Gorsuch) avoided discussing the fact that Cuozzo made an honest
attempt to consider the statutory structure and legislative history in
reaching its conclusion.71 SAS attempted to sidestep that issue by making
it sound like there was no textual ambiguity in the first place.72 The majority explicitly avoided looking to congressional intent: “[A]s long as the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need
for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute.”73 The
Court also explicitly ignored any policy arguments: “Policy arguments are
properly addressed to Congress, not this Court.”74 In fact, SAS arguably
contorted even its textual arguments75 to reach the result it wanted: more
judicial review of agency action.
71. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141; see SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60.
72. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1354–55; see also Andrew C. Michaels, Response, SAS Institute
Inc. v. Iancu: The Statute is Hereby Clear, GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (May 7,
2018), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2611&context=faculty_
publications [https://perma.cc/BAT8-33HV] (“The Supreme doorkeeper has spoken: the
statute is clear, and that’s the Law.”).
73. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1357 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235,
240–41 (1989)) (alteration in original).
74. Id. at 1358.
75. For example, ignoring the fact that the requirement for the Board to “issue a final
written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the
petitioner” cannot refer to all the claims in the original petition because some claims will
have been settled or withdrawn by the time the Board issues a final written decision. See id.
at 1361–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)) (emphasis added); see also
id. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s “wooden reading” of the
statute); Michaels, supra note 72 (“Of the twelve federal Article III judges to have fully
considered and decided this statutory issue, six reached one conclusion, and six reached the
opposite conclusion. This sort of empirical analysis could lead one to suspect that the statute might not be so clear after all.”).
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By ignoring logic and congressional intent, SAS reached a result that
makes little sense for the agency. It decided that the PTO must review all
claims in the petition, no matter how frivolous, if it chooses to institute an
IPR.76 The opinion thus completely ignored Congress’s desire to create a
more efficient system of post-grant review.77 As a result, the PTO had to
allocate resources in a less efficient manner,78 forcing it (and the Federal
Circuit on appeal) to spend more time reviewing claims the Board did not
believe warranted review.79 This additional work led the PTO to look for
shortcuts. After the SAS decision, the PTO began to find procedural reasons for denying institution in greater and greater numbers.80
In sum, the SAS opinion resulted in a more dysfunctional and less efficient post-grant review process, in complete contravention of congressional intent. It is often a red flag when the Court states that “[p]olicy
arguments are properly addressed to Congress.”81 There may be policy
decisions lurking behind such purely textual opinions.82 The SAS opinion
may have achieved exactly what Justice Gorsuch intended—to artificially
handicap a proceeding he believed unconstitutional in the first place.83
Thryv, though a second win for the pro-administrative camp of the
Court, did not help matters because it did not actually reverse the holding
76. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1354 (“So when § 318(a) says the Board’s final written decision
‘shall’ resolve the patentability of ‘any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,’ it means
the Board must address every claim the petitioner has challenged.”); id. at 1362 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[Under] the majority’s reading . . . the Board must consider and write a final . . . decision in respect to the challenges to all . . . claims [in the petition], including
[many] frivolous challenges.”).
77. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48; 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (requiring the PTO to
consider “the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely
complete proceedings instituted” when passing regulations in this area).
78. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING: FEE SETTING HEARING 52 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
PPAC_Hearing_Transcript_20180906.pdf [https://perma.cc/29PB-4HJF] (“The Supreme
Court decision in SAS . . . is expected to impact PTAB costs. PTAB will no longer be able
to institute on less than all claims challenged in a petition, leading to significant additional
work.” (statement of Brendan Hourigan, Director, Office of Planning and Budget)).
79. See SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1364 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[SAS] lead[s] to judicial review of the Board’s decision about . . . frivolous challenges.”).
80. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, LLP, PTAB SNAPSHOT: A QUARTERLY REPORT ON TRENDS AND NEW PRECEDENT AT THE PTAB 4 (2021), https://media.orrick.com/
Media%20Library/public/files/insights/2021/orrick-ptab-snapshot-q2-2021.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2M3Y-HDJ6] (observing that between 2018 and 2020, the Board began to “provide[ ] new reasons to exercise its discretion” and “has been more aggressively exercising
its discretion . . . to deny institution”).
81. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1358.
82. See Jonathan T. Molot, Exchange: The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 50 (2006) (“[B]y placing so much emphasis on the distinction between clarity and
ambiguity, and by rushing to find clarity and thereby excluding consideration of statutory
purposes, aggressive textualism may undermine one of textualism’s principal benefits—its
purported ability to cabin judicial discretion, thereby rendering judges more faithful to the
laws actually enacted by Congress, and less likely to impose their own policy preferences.
Just as aggressive purposivism can be manipulated so as to achieve a judge’s desired outcome, so too is aggressive textualism highly manipulable.”).
83. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1380–86 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the PTAB unconstitutionally takes
power to invalidate patents away from the Judiciary).
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in SAS. Thus, it left in place SAS’s impractical prohibition against partial
institution—these types of half-baked compromise opinions may be the
new trend in a Court that cannot agree on much.84
Thryv’s second problem is that, to avoid the holding in SAS, the Court
developed an even more contorted test for assessing whether review is
warranted—by distinguishing “the manner in which the agency’s review
‘proceeds’ once instituted” from “whether the agency should have instituted review at all.”85 The meaning of that distinction is hardly clear
given that SAS itself dealt with partial institution, but somehow managed
to characterize it as an issue of the final written decision. It is also an
artificial distinction that can be manipulated by the courts and the PTAB
without any rhyme or reason, as demonstrated by the Windy City86 discussion below.
The third problem with Thryv is its ultimate conclusion, based on
Cuozzo’s overinclusive reasoning, that courts cannot review the decision
to institute a time-barred IPR.87 It seems strange to presume that Congress would create such a straightforward legal requirement yet anticipate
no mechanism for its enforcement or review in the courts.88 This legal
requirement is not “some minor statutory technicality,” such as the petition specificity issue that came up in Cuozzo.89 The one-year bar was a
compromise reached by Congress to satisfy patent owners in their interest of quiet title.90 Nor is it a preliminary decision that relies on the PTO’s
expertise that can be corrected at a later stage of the proceeding, such as
the PTAB’s initial reasonable likelihood determination.91 By allowing the
84. See, e.g., America’s Supreme Court Is Less One-Sided than Liberals Feared, THE
ECONOMIST (June 24, 2021), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/06/24/americassupreme-court-is-less-one-sided-than-liberals-feared [https://perma.cc/7R7D-8RHM]
(“Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Thomas are itching to hasten a conservative revolution but,
for now, the liberals, the chief and Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh are on a more cautious
path paved with narrow rulings. Instead of split 6-3, the court is more like 3-3-3.”).
85. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1376 (2020).
86. Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
87. Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1370.
88. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It may
be presumed that Congress does not intend administrative agencies, agents of Congress’[s]
own creation, to ignore clear jurisdictional, regulatory, statutory, or constitutional
commands . . . .”).
89. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016).
90. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 47–48 (2011); see also Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom
Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (“[The one-year bar
provision] codifies one of the ‘important procedural rights’ that Congress chose to afford
patent owners in the IPR context.” (quoting Lindahl v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768,
791 (1985)), abrogated by Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1367)).
91. Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1374 (“The time bar is not merely about preliminary procedural requirements that may be corrected if they fail to reflect real-world facts, but about
real-world facts that limit the agency’s authority to act under the IPR scheme.”). A final
written decision that reaches a final merits decision on the claims makes it clear whether
“there [was] a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” at the petition stage. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
This is similar to a denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 15A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3905.1 (2d ed. 2021) (“Failure to plead adequately a claim that in fact is
proved at trial should not warrant reversal.”).
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agency to ignore statutory errors with impunity, Thryv’s holding highlighted the flaws of the Cuozzo decision that may not have been clear at
the time Cuozzo was issued.
The Federal Circuit’s Windy City decision demonstrates how the second and third problems with Thryv interact. In Windy City, Facebook,
Inc. petitioned the PTAB for review of a number of claims in patents
owned by Windy City Innovations, LLC.92 The Board instituted the requested IPR.93 Facebook then filed two additional IPR petitions asserting
that more claims needed to be reviewed in those same Windy City patents.94 Although the additional IPRs were time-barred under the statute,
the PTAB instituted those IPRs and allowed them to be joined to the
already pending, timely-filed IPR.95
The Federal Circuit recognized that, based on Thryv, the statute’s
nonappealability provision prevented the court from reviewing the
PTAB’s decision to institute the time-barred IPRs.96 Yet based on
Thryv’s interpretation of SAS, the court decided that the joinder decision
is a reviewable challenge to “already-instituted IPRs.”97 The court then
held that the PTAB is not allowed to join the same party (i.e., Facebook)
with new issues (i.e., newly challenged claims) to an already pending
IPR.98 The court vacated the Board’s final written decisions with respect
to the newly added claims and remanded to the Board to reconsider its
institution decisions in the time-barred IPRs.99
This strange outcome makes it plain how contrived the reasoning in
SAS and Thryv really was. It appears that the Federal Circuit in Windy
City believed that the PTAB acted outside of its scope of authority when
it instituted the time-barred IPRs.100 But instead of simply stating that
and deinstituting the proceedings, the Thryv and SAS framework forced
the court to characterize the problem as review of already-instituted IPRs
(like in SAS) instead of an issue of institution (as in Thryv).101 Ultimately, this legal sleight of hand probably created only a trivial hiccup for
the PTO because Thryv theoretically allows the agency to go back and
institute those untimely Facebook IPRs without joinder, with no legal
92. Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2020).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1331.
97. Id. at 1332 (quoting Cross-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief in Response to the
Court’s Order of April 30, 2020 at 10, Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973
F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Nos. 2018-1400, 2018-1401, 2018-1402, 2018-1403, 2018-1537,
2018-1540, 2018-1541), 2020 WL 3169493).
98. Id. at 1333.
99. Id. at 1339.
100. See id. at 1338–39.
101. Id. at 1332 (“[U]nlike the challenges raised in . . . Thryv, which specifically sought
review of petitions that the Board had instituted and the decisions to instate those petitions, . . . . Windy City’s appeal of the Board’s joinder decisions is more like the revieable
challenge in SAS, which concerned whether the PTO had exceeded its statutory authority
as to the manner in which the already-insititued IPR proceeded.”).
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consequence. The institution framework thus created legal acrobatics instead of practical case law. The PTO is now also forced to play this game,
trying to frame every regulation and PTO practice as related to an institution decision to avoid judicial review.102
In sum, with the scenario created by the development of the institution
trio, all logic has left the building. Courts cannot easily review agency
action that exceeds statutory authority, and the Agency has arbitrarily
lost its ability to make decisions about its own efficient resource allocation. This hardly seems functional or in line with what Congress intended.
IV. A NEW (BETTER) APPROACH TO INSTITUTION REVIEW
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the institution trio became progressively more unmoored from congressional intent and the realities of how
administrative agencies function. Part of the problem is that the statute
and legislative history do not provide a clear answer as to the scope of the
nonappealability provision, as detailed in Section IV.A below. But, as explained in Section IV.B, the functional approach advocated in Heckler
helps bridge this gap and provide a practical solution to this murky area.
A. UNCERTAINTY

IN THE

TEXTUALIST-INTENTIONALIST APPROACH

Justice Breyer, the author of the majority opinion in Cuozzo, typically
favors practical and functional approaches based on textualism, legislative history, and common sense.103 In other cases dealing with the PTAB,
including his most recent dissent in United States v. Arthrex, he has advocated for “a functional . . . rather than a formalist, judicial-rules-based
approach.”104 He has argued that the Court needs to “take account of,
and place weight on, why Congress enacted a particular statutory limitation” and to “consider the practical consequences that are likely to follow
from Congress’[s] chosen scheme.”105 In his SAS dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer advocated for a presumption that Congress intended to “create[ ] . . . a well-functioning statutory scheme” and for consideration of
what “hypothetical reasonable legislator[s] . . . would likely have
intended.”106
Yet Justice Breyer’s Cuozzo opinion, and the blowback that followed
in SAS and Thryv, merely led to confusion and dysfunction. Surely “a
well-functioning statutory scheme” would consider the respective roles of
102. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Porous Court-Agency Border in Patent Law, 51 AKL. REV. 1069, 1079–80 (2017).
103. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 828 n.15 (noting Justice Breyer has argued that
“overemphasis on text can lead courts astray, divorcing law from life,” and has advocated
for “a purposive approach to statutory interpretation” (quoting STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85–101 (2005)).
104. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1995 (2021) (Breyer, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id.
106. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
RON

2022]

Functional Approach to Agency (In)Action

131

the agency and the courts in administering a new statute. Yet none of the
institution trio decisions really grappled with this head-on.
Instead, the institution trio opinions read too much (or too little, in the
case of SAS) into a sparse legislative history of the nonappealability provision and twisted the law to achieve some desired outcome—be it
greater or lesser judicial scrutiny of agency action. But there was no discussion in the legislative history about what types of judicial review Congress anticipated with respect to institution. Examination of the text and
the general congressional discussions related to the AIA provide only
broad strokes of what Congress intended: to give the PTO more discretion while leaving certain guardrails in place to prevent abuse.107
1. Text108
The text of the nonappealability provision does not seem ambiguous on
its face: “The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter
partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”109 It
seems clear that a party may not appeal the Director’s choice to institute
or not institute an IPR.
But what is the scope of the Director’s “determination”? Did Congress
really mean that at no point in time can any decision that leads to the
“determination” ever be judicially reviewed? At least two plausible readings of the statute have been proposed. Justice Alito proposed one alternative textualist reading in his dissent in Cuozzo. He pointed out that the
statute does not say the Director’s determination is unreviewable, just
107. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 314; H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38–56 (2011).
108. The text of the relevant provisions are as follows:
35 U.S. Code § 312—Petitions
(a) Requirements of Petition.—A petition filed . . . may be considered only
if . . .
(3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity, each claim
challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and
the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim . . . .
35 U.S.C. § 314—Institution of inter partes review
(a) Threshold.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be
instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in
the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
petition. . . .
(d) No Appeal.—The determination by the Director whether to institute an
inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.
35 U.S.C. § 315—Relation to other proceedings or actions
....
(b) Patent Owner’s Action.—An inter partes review may not be instituted if
the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date
on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is
served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. . . .
35 U.S.C. § 318—Decision of the Board
(a) Final Written Decision.—If an inter partes review is instituted and not
dismissed under this chapter, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall issue a
final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim
challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added . . . .
109. § 314(d).
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unappealable.110 He argued that the underlying institution decision could
be reviewed in an appeal from the final written decision by the Board.111
In an alternative reading, in Wi-Fi One (later abrogated by Thryv), the
Federal Circuit emphasized that the nonappealability provision says “determination . . . under this section” and decided that the language was
accordingly limited to the reasonable likelihood threshold determination
listed in the same section of the statute.112
Both of these readings provide unsatisfying solutions. Neither considers legislative history or congressional intent, instead emphasizing the
presumption of judicial in vacuo.113 The Wi-Fi One reading leaves little
discretion in the hands of the agency, which Congress intended to expand
with the AIA.114 Further, Justice Alito’s reading makes the nonappealability provision all but superfluous in most contexts,115 and provides no
guidance on the partial institution question in SAS nor any theoretical
rationale justifying the unreviewability of institution denials that would
result from his interpretation.
The broader statutory context provides more insight but is hardly definitive. For example, the current statute specifies various requirements
that must be met if an IPR is instituted (e.g., the one-year bar, reasonable
likelihood threshold, etc.) but specifies nothing about when an IPR can
be denied. This may hint at Congress’s intent that the PTAB has more
discretion to deny institution than when it chooses to institute. Although
a desire to curb agency discretion can hint at congressional intent for
availability of judicial review,116 this is indirect evidence at best.
110. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2151 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Id. This approach would only work to the extent the questions in the preliminary
decision have not been mooted during the proceeding. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
91 (“Failure to plead adequately a claim that in fact is proved at trial should not warrant
reversal.”).
112. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018), abrogated by Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020) (emphasis in original). For another example of such “extremely strained” reading of similar statutory
language in the environmental context, see Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and
Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 162 (1985) (“[T]he Court
construed the savings clause to mean only that nothing ‘in this section’—that is, the citizen
suit provisions of the statute—preempted the federal common law of nuisance. The majority opinion concluded, however, that the rest of the statute was intended to have such a
preemptive effect.” (footnote omitted) (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
328–29 (1981))).
113. Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367 (“To overcome this presumption, Congress must
clearly and convincingly indicate its intent to prohibit judicial review. We find no clear and
convincing indication of such congressional intent.”); Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2151 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As I have explained, the statute’s text does not
require [the majority’s] conclusion [of reviewability].” (emphasis added)).
114. See infra Section IV.A.2.
115. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140 (“The Administrative Procedure Act already limits review to final agency decisions . . . . And the agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter
committed to the Patent Office’s discretion. So, read as limited to such preliminary and
discretionary decisions, the ‘No Appeal’ provision would seem superfluous.” (internal citations omitted)).
116. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834–35 (1985) (“If [Congress] has indicated an
intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful stan-
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Statutory language from prior post-grant PTO proceedings also provides a mostly murky picture but shows some chronological progression
towards granting the PTO more discretion and more shielding from judicial review—especially with respect to the merits threshold and denial of
institution. The ex parte reexamination (reexam) from 1980 required the
Director to institute a reexamination if a merits threshold was met.117 But
his determination that a merits threshold was not met was made “final
and nonappealable.”118 Therefore, in this early proceeding, judicial review of the merits threshold question was still allowed if reexam was instituted (but not when it was denied).
In 1999, Congress created a new proceeding: the inter partes
reexam.119 This proceeding, the predecessor to IPRs, was replaced by
IPRs in the AIA.120 Inter partes reexam still mandated institution upon
meeting of a substantive threshold121 but expanded the category for what
is nonappealable. In this newer proceeding, the Director’s finding of
whether or not the substantive threshold was met was “final and nonappealable.”122 Congress therefore expanded the Director’s non-reviewable
discretion. While both reexam proceedings prohibited review of a denial
of institution based on the substantive threshold, the later inter partes
reexam also prohibited review of a grant of institution based on that
threshold inquiry.123
In 2011, Congress introduced the IPR proceeding and enacted a new
nonappealability provision for it. The new proceeding did not require the
Director to institute review when the threshold was met, providing the
dards for defining the limits of that discretion, . . . [then] courts may require that the agency
follow that law . . . .”).
117. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 2, Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 15-446),
2015 WL 8621635; 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (“[F]ollowing the filing of a request for reexamination . . . the Director will determine whether a substantial new question of patentability
affecting any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the request . . . .”); § 304 (“If . . .
the Director finds that a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of a
patent is raised, the determination will include an order for reexamination of the patent for
resolution of the question.” (emphasis added)).
118. 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (“A determination by the Director pursuant to subsection (a) of
this section that no substantial new question of patentability has been raised will be final
and nonappealable.”).
119. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 117, at 2.
120. Id. at 3.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (“[A]fter the filing of a request for inter partes reexamination . . . , the Director shall determine whether a substantial new question of patentability
affecting any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the request. . . .”); 35 U.S.C. § 313
(amended 2011) (stating that if the Director finds that “‘a substantial new question of
patentability affecting a claim of a patent is raised’, . . . the determination shall include an
order for inter partes reexamination of the patent for resolution of the question.” (emphasis added)).
122. 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (“A determination by the Director under subsection (a) shall be
final and non-appealable.” (emphasis added)); see also Callaway Golf Co. v. Kappos, 802
F. Supp. 2d 678, 685 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“Section 312(c) . . . exempts from judicial review the
PTO’s substantive determination that a reexamination application raises ‘a substantial new
question of patentability.’”).
123. 35 U.S.C. § 312(c).
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PTO with even more discretion to allocate resources.124 Congress therefore chose broader language of what’s not appealable—”[the] determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this
section shall be final and nonappealable”—to reflect the fact that institution was no longer solely a question of the merits threshold.125 In contrast, the earlier inter partes reexam had only made the “determination
by the Director under subsection (a) [establishing the merits threshold] . . . final and non-appealable.”126
Thus, because the Director was not required to institute an IPR every
time the threshold was met, the new IPR proceedings, for the first time,
allowed the Director to consider factors other than the merit of the petition in rejecting a petition. In fact, Congress provided no guidance as to
what reasons the Director should consider in a denial. For example, in
theory, the Director could reject a petition because of PTO congestion.
This increased discretion supports the theory that Congress intended to
curtail judicial review with respect to IPR institution denials. Moreover,
based on the prior inter partes reexam procedure, Congress did not seem
to want the courts to review the Director’s preliminary merits threshold
finding, regardless of whether review was instituted or not.127
But what about all the statutory requirements Congress specified for
granting institution (e.g., petition specificity, one-year bar, etc.)? In previous proceedings, Congress had only expressly addressed judicial review
of the substantive threshold. Did Congress, in the new IPR proceeding,
intend to exclude (for the first time ever) review of other statutory defects in a decision granting institution? That is a bigger leap in curtailing
judicial review compared to previous proceedings.
With the ambiguity in the scope of the IPR nonappealability provision
and the limited clues provided by the statutory requirements of prior
post-grant PTO proceedings, the textual arguments hit a dead end.
2. Legislative History
The legislative history, like the legislative text, evidences a general intent towards granting the PTO more discretion but without clarifying its
scope and without explicitly addressing judicial review. Congress recognized the PTO’s limited resources and need to sometimes turn away even
meritorious petitions in the interest of efficiency and timeliness.128 Thus,
124. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be
instituted unless . . . .” (emphasis added)).
125. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (emphasis added).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (emphasis added).
127. This may, however, be an unimportant form of discretion in the case of an instituted IPR. See infra Section V.B.1 (discussing that the merits question will often be
mooted by a later, final decision).
128. 157 CONG. REC. S1377 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (“[I]t is
better that the Office turn away some petitions that otherwise satisfy the threshold for
instituting an inter partes or post-grant review than it is to allow the Office to develop a
backlog of instituted reviews that precludes the Office from timely completing all proceed-
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there is evidence Congress intended to increase the discretion of (and
likely limit judicial review of) the PTO in denying petitions.
At the same time, Congress had concerns about potential abuse of the
IPR process to harass patent owners,129 and thus imposed a one-year
time bar on institution and raised the substantive threshold inquiry for
institution (higher than the level of reexam proceedings).130 Do these requirements limiting PTO discretion imply that Congress intended to increase the scope of judicial review? Or did Congress instead intend for
the PTO to police itself through greater regulation authority (instead of
imposing judicial review)?131 All we can surmise is that Congress appears
to have had some awareness of the limitations of an agency to internally
reduce abuses, aiming to “move us toward a patent system that is objective, transparent, clear, and fair to all parties” with the passage of the
AIA.132
Overall, the statutory text and legislative history suggest that Congress
intended to empower the PTO with greater ability to make decisions regarding IPRs and their institution. Yet there are also indications that
Congress did not intend to give the PTO unbridled, unreviewable power.
The traditional administrative law approach under the Heckler doctrine
(discussed next) can provide a more pragmatic and functional interpretation of the nonappealability provision using these insights from congressional intent while also considering the respective roles of the courts and
the administrative agencies in the administration of statutory schemes.
B. CLARITY

FROM THE

HECKLER DOCTRINE

1. Tradition of Mandamus in Administrative Law
Long before Heckler, traditional administrative law doctrine supported
the idea that courts should have only a limited role in forcing agencies to
act. In other words, courts provided agencies with a looser leash when it
came to inaction than action. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
first passed in 1946 and meant to govern the procedures of administrative
agencies, explicitly distinguished between the circumstances when a court
can “compel agency action” and when a court can “hold unlawful and set
ings.”); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (discussing “the purpose of the [post-grant
review proceeding statute] as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation”).
129. S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 16 n.79 (2009) (“The minority draws heavily on the possibility that inter partes reexamination can be used as a tool for abuse by infringers to harass
patent owners. The Committee is concerned about the potential for abuse and, therefore,
specifically directed the USPTO, in promulgating rules for the new first-window, to prevent such misuse.”).
130. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 164–65 (2011) (commenting that both provisions “are motivated by assertions that the inter partes procedure may be abused to harass
patent owners and interfere with the enforcement of valid patents”).
131. S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 18 (2009) (“[T]he Committee intends for the USPTO to
address potential abuses and current inefficiencies under its expanded procedural
authority.”).
132. 157 CONG. REC. S1380 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (emphasis added) (statement of
Sen. Jon Kyl).
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aside agency action.”133
Even before Congress had passed the APA, there had already been a
long history of mandamus law that influenced how Congress viewed judicial review of agency action and inaction.134 Judicial practice before the
APA, which the APA attempted to codify, did not “empower a court to
[use its mandamus powers to] substitute its discretion for that of an administrative agency and thus exercise administrative duties.”135 “[A]
court may [have] require[d] an agency to take action [i.e., make a decision] upon a matter, without directing how it shall act.”136 The Supreme
Court has since confirmed that the “APA did not significantly alter the
‘common law’ of judicial review of agency action.”137
2. Heckler’s Reasoning
In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court simply applied this traditional view of judicial review of agency action.138 In that case, “several
prison inmates . . . sentenced to death . . . . petitioned the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)” to prevent the use of lethal injection drugs for
capital punishment because they were not approved for this purpose
under their labeling.139 The FDA refused, and the inmates asked the
courts to compel the agency to take enforcement action under the relevant statute.140 Although the D.C. Circuit sided with the inmates, agreeing that the “FDA’s refusal to take enforcement actions [was] both
reviewable and an abuse of discretion,”141 the Supreme Court
reversed.142
In this case, the statute did not address the issue of judicial review,
rendering inapplicable 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) of the APA, which prevents
judicial review when a “statute[ ] preclude[s] judicial review.”143 However, the Supreme Court explained that a presumption of judicial unreviewability of agency action can occur even when Congress has not
expressly precluded review under the statute.144 An agency action can
still be “committed to agency discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) “if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no mean133. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
134. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 108 (1947) (noting judicial provisions of the APA were intended to be a
restatement of existing judicial practice prior to the enactment of the APA).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (quoting 5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28:5 (2d ed. 1984)).
138. See id.
139. Id. at 823.
140. Id. at 823–24.
141. Id. at 823.
142. Id. at 827.
143. Id. at 828 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)).
144. Id. at 828, 830 (distinguishing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)’s effect of barring review “when
Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review” from § 701(a)(2), which precludes review where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law”).
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ingful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”145 The Supreme Court explained that, in particular, “an agency’s
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute
discretion.”146
The Court then proceeded to explain why an agency’s decision not to
prosecute or enforce “has traditionally been ‘committed to agency discretion.’”147 First, congressional intent seems to play a role. Congress can
choose to provide “a meaningful standard” for judicial review of agency
discretion in the statute, but failing to provide such a standard makes it
“impossible [for courts] to evaluate [the] agency action.”148 The Court
explained that this more typically occurs with agency inaction, rather than
when there is an “affirmative act . . . [by an agency] under a statute that
set[s] clear guidelines for determining when such [action] should be
[taken].”149
A second consideration is that of institutional competence. The Court
emphasized that if Congress does not provide a standard for review of
agency discretion, the courts may not be “the most appropriate body to
police . . . [an agency’s] performance.”150 In the case of agency inaction,
“an agency decision not to enforce [the statute] often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise.”151 Such factors include: (1) a substantive assessment of the
violation, (2) “whether agency resources are best spent on this violation
or another,” (3) “whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts,” (4)
“whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the
agency’s overall policies, and,” (5) “whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.”152 Agencies are “far better
equipped than the courts” in weighing these factors and prioritizing accordingly.153 A third consideration of the courts appears to be a separation of powers argument:
Finally, we recognize that an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings
shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long
been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to
145. Id. at 830.
146. Id. at 831.
147. Id. at 832 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
148. Id. at 830; see also id. at 834–35 (“If [Congress] has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining
the limits of that discretion, . . . [then] courts may require that the agency follow that law; if
it has not, then an agency refusal to institute proceedings is a decision ‘committed to
agency discretion by law’ within the meaning of that section.”).
149. Id. at 831 (“Refusals to take enforcement steps generally involve precisely the opposite situation . . . .”).
150. Id. at 834.
151. Id. at 831.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 831–32.
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“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”154
However, “the presumption [of unreviewability] may be rebutted
where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to
follow in exercising its enforcement powers.”155 Therefore, “[i]f [Congress] has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of that
discretion, . . . [then] courts may require that the agency follow that
law . . . .”156
Heckler also discusses situations when an agency chooses to act. According to the Court’s discussion in Heckler, a decision to act is generally
an “exercise [of an agency’s] coercive power over an individual’s liberty
or property rights,” which “infringe[s] upon areas that courts often are
called upon to protect.”157 Affirmative agency action also “provides a focus for judicial review . . . . to determine whether the agency exceeded its
statutory powers.”158 Agency inaction, as explained above, often lacks
such criteria.
3. Applying the Reasoning to Institution Trio
How is Heckler applicable in the IPR institution context? There are at
least three characteristics of the IPR institution context that seem to
facially distinguish Heckler. First, IPRs are technically not enforcement
actions. Second, there is express statutory language addressing judicial
review for IPRs, unlike in Heckler. Third, Heckler appears, at least at first
blush, to have limited applicability in scenarios where an agency has chosen to act.
Yet Heckler’s broad, functional language and pragmatic considerations
can be applicable in contexts beyond its factual underpinnings. First, although IPRs are not enforcement actions per se, they involve many of the
same considerations for an agency. For enforcement, agencies have to decide how to use limited resources to investigate statutory or regulatory
violations and prosecute offenders. Likewise, the PTO has to decide how
to use limited resources to determine whether a patent (or a portion
thereof) has a reasonable likelihood of being invalid under the relevant
statute and whether to proceed with an involved trial-like proceeding to
make that patent unenforceable as a legal right. Thus, both types of actions involve “judgments that are at the core of the executive power and
beyond the competence of courts.”159 Heckler’s focus on institutional
competence and the role of the Executive Branch is thus relevant in both
contexts.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 832 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
Id. at 832–33.
Id. at 834–35.
See id. at 832 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY
ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 953 (3d ed. 2020).
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Then-Judge Scalia also believed that Heckler’s teachings extended beyond the enforcement context to other agency decisions dealing with resource allocation, such as “allocation of grant funds among various
eligible recipients.”160 He wrote, “[s]uch an allocation of available funds
shares with agency decisions not to prosecute what the Supreme Court
has called in the latter context a ‘general unsuitability for judicial review,’
because it ‘often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors
which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.’”161
The fact that an express nonappealability provision is present in the
IPR context should also not necessarily bar the application of Heckler.
Heckler bases its unreviewability presumption on 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2),
which precludes review under the APA if “agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law.”162 As Heckler explains, § 701(a)(1) applies
“when Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review”
while (a)(2) applies “where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, [but] review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court
would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s
exercise of discretion.”163 This broad language may indicate that Heckler’s reasoning of § 701(a)(2) applies “when congressional instructions are
unclear.”164 For example, in Webster v. Doe,165 Congress had arguably
expressed its intention to preclude judicial review by allowing “[t]he Director of Central Intelligence . . . in his discretion, [to] terminate the employment of any officer.”166 Yet the Supreme Court found that “[t]his
standard fairly exudes deference to the Director, and appears . . . to foreclose the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review.”167
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the case went even further, suggesting that
Heckler may have implied that § 701(a)(2) is actually meant to preclude
review of all “issues and . . . areas that [a]re beyond the range of judicial
review.”168 Whatever the true proper scope of § 701(a)(2) may be, these
arguments do seem to indicate that Heckler may be applicable even in
contexts where there is a judicial review provision but where Congress’s
intention is nevertheless unclear, as in the case with IPR institution.169
Finally, can Heckler be useful in deciding questions related to the reviewability of an agency’s decision to act? For example, can we still look
160. Cal. Hum. Dev. Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
161. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831).
162. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
163. Id. at 830.
164. STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ADRIAN
VERMEULE & MICHAEL E. HERZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 804 (8th ed.).
165. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
166. Id. at 594 (emphasis added) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)).
167. Id. at 600.
168. Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2)—but not (a)(1)—in arguing that “the agency’s decision to deny a petition is a
matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion”).
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to Heckler to decide to what extent judicial review of the PTO decision to
institute an IPR is appropriate? Once an agency has chosen to proceed
with enforcement (or with an IPR proceeding), it seems that the Supreme
Court would look to the general APA presumption of reviewability, as
expressed in Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC.170 But what about the analysis
the agency has to perform in order to decide to proceed? That seems to
be a bit of a gray area. On the one hand, one could simply apply the
Mach Mining presumption of reviewability and decide whether it is rebutted by the statutory language and structure.171 On the other hand, this
type of preliminary agency decision may still implicate some of the considerations Heckler weighed against congressional intent, such as institutional competence and the proper role of the Executive Branch. Thus,
Heckler’s reasoning may still have relevance (and additional insights) in
determining the proper scope of judicial review in preliminary agency decisions to proceed with enforcement (or an IPR proceeding).
In all, Heckler provides a common-sense, functional approach meant to
exploit the respective competencies of the three branches of government,
while attempting to maintain “a well-functioning statutory scheme.”172
Therefore, Heckler’s considerations of congressional intent, institutional
competence, and separation of powers in distinguishing reviewability of
agency action and inaction provide the much-needed functional and pragmatic rubric for construing the AIA’s IPR nonappealability provision.
In terms of congressional intent, Heckler provides a simple presumption—did Congress provide “a meaningful standard” for judicial review
of agency discretion? In terms of denial of institution, it is clear Congress
provided few guideposts. There is no mandate to institute an IPR and no
criteria in the statute about when denial is appropriate: “The Director
may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . .”173
Under Heckler, it would appear that the denial of IPR institution is “a
decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”174
Even more clarity can be gleaned from Heckler once institutional competence is considered. When the PTO declines review, it may be considering a variety of factors, including factors contemplated by Congress in a
related context: the “effect of [the agency decision] on the economy, the
integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office,
and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted.”175 Just as in Heckler, here the courts may not be “the most appropriate body to police” this type of decision-making process.176 Therefore,
170. 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015) (“[T]his Court applies a ‘strong presumption’ favoring
judicial review of administrative action.” (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. Fam. Physicians,
476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).
171. Id. (“[The presumption] fails when a statute’s language or structure demonstrates
that Congress wanted an agency to police its own conduct.”).
172. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (emphasis added).
174. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
175. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (providing considerations of when the agency should regulate).
176. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834.
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SAS was plainly wrong in forcing the agency to institute on all grounds.
The agency is generally much more aware of facts on the ground, and
Congress intended the PTO to make such case-specific resource allocation decisions.177
Finally, the separation of powers consideration is strong with respect to
IPR denials. The PTO is an executive agency, and consideration of the
policies of the current administration may be part of its decision of how
to allocate resources. The courts should hardly interfere with this “special
province of the Executive Branch” without any guideposts.178
In contrast, when the PTO does institute review, the congressional intent considerations point the other way. Congress provided a variety of
statutory limitations: the one-year time bar, the reasonable likelihood
threshold, and other requirements for petitions.179 Whether one looks to
Mach Mining or Heckler, it seems clear that Congress intended to limit
agency exercise of its discretionary power here. As Heckler states, “If
[Congress] has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement
discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the limits
of that discretion, . . . [then] courts may require that the agency follow
that law . . . .”180 Though Heckler was specifically referring to the context
of an agency’s decision not to enforce, its reasoning regarding congressional intent aligns with Mach Mining, which was not so limited.181 Of
course, review of all these requirements may not necessarily be appropriate in view of other statutory text (i.e., rebutting any presumption),182 but
the decision in Heckler (as it aligns with Mach Mining) at least helps to
orient the Court in the right direction in terms of congressional intent.
Yet Heckler can provide more guidance than Mach Mining because it
does not focus solely on congressional intent.183 Heckler also reasons that
once the PTO makes the decision to commit resources and institute an
177. See Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENV’T. L.J. 461, 478 (2008) (noting a decision not to
act implicates resource allocation more than a decision to act); see also Heckler, 470 U.S. at
839 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Individual, isolated nonenforcement decisions, however,
must be made by hundreds of agencies each day. It is entirely permissible to presume that
Congress has not intended courts to review such mundane matters, absent either some
indication of congressional intent to the contrary . . . .”).
178. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
179. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a), 314(a), 315(b).
180. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834–35.
181. Other legal theories, such as those considering collective action problems and
agency capture, also support the notion that when meaningful statutory standards are provided, courts are traditionally expected to defer less to agency discretion. See, e.g., Eric
Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
40 (2008) (“[A]gency failures to implement regulatory statutes may be the result of asymmetries in the ability of regulatory subjects and regulatory beneficiaries to monitor and
influence the political process. Thus, in order to counterbalance those asymmetries, at least
in the most egregious situations, courts should uphold clear, specific congressional requirements for agencies to act.”).
182. See infra Section V.B.1 (discussing that it is not clear whether Congress wanted the
courts to review the reasonable likelihood threshold).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 170–71 (discussing the applicability of Heckler
in this context).
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IPR, and to use its coercive power to potentially deprive a person of a
patent right, the argument for deference is much weaker.184 Now the
PTO is in an “area[ ] that courts often are called upon to protect.”185
Moreover, in terms of Heckler’s consideration of comparative institutional competence, the courts may be better equipped than the agency to
decide novel legal questions that arise at the institution stage, such as
those related to the one-year bar, like when was a complaint filed in civil
court, who the real parties in interest are, or whether Congress meant to
effectuate the one-year bar in joinder decisions.
In fact, the PTAB has shown a discomfort with such legal analysis. In
the PTAB decision underlying Thryv, the Board simply cited Federal Circuit caselaw—with a single sentence and without any further analysis—in
holding that a voluntary dismissal of a civil case does not trigger the time
bar.186 In view of this discomfort and the PTO’s generally weak position
in shaping patent law,187 the PTAB should not be the institution that gets
the last word on what the statute means in this area (despite Thryv’s
holding to the contrary). And the courts should not have to contort themselves in order to address these novel legal questions, like the Federal
Circuit had to do in Windy City in view of SAS and Thryv.188
This is not meant to imply that the courts should entangle themselves
in minor, day-to-day operations of the PTO and its institution decisions.
For minor questions, such as whether a petition meets the formal requirements (e.g., the issue in Cuozzo under 35 U.S.C § 312(a)), the court can
choose not to review those based on the APA’s prejudicial error requirement.189 As for whether the reasonable likelihood threshold was met
upon institution, although the Heckler approach does not provide a clean
answer here,190 it is likely that courts will never actually review this preliminary decision of the PTO because it “will be subsumed by the ultimate question whether the challenger should in fact prevail” on
184. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
185. Biber, supra note 181, at 10 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832).
186. See Oracle Corp. v. Click-to-Call Techs. LP, No. IPR2013-00312, 2013 WL
11311788, at *7 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2013) (“The Federal Circuit consistently has interpreted
the effect of such dismissals as leaving the parties as though the action had never been
brought.” (first citing Graves v. Principi, 294 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002); and then
citing Bonneville Assocs. v. Barram, 165 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
187. Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the Federal Circuit?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335,
336–37 (2011) (“Additionally, the PTO’s relative weakness as an agency cannot be denied.
Unlike most agencies with portfolios involving complex technological and scientific
problems, the PTO does not have rulemaking authority over the substantive questions that
it addresses. The Federal Circuit appears to have taken this lack of rulemaking authority to
mean that the PTO is entitled to no deference on any of its views of substantive law or
policy (including views that may be expressed in adjudication of individual patents).” (citing Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2011))).
188. See supra Part III.
189. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2153
(2016) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 5 U.S.C. §706) (“[E]rrors
that do not cause a patent owner prejudice may not warrant relief.”).
190. See infra Section V.B.1 (arguing Heckler can “cut both ways” in deciding this
question).

2022]

Functional Approach to Agency (In)Action

143

appeal.191
Overall, the Heckler approach explains why Cuozzo, SAS, and Thryv
all reached incorrect conclusions if one separately considers agency action and inaction in terms of congressional intent, institutional competence, and separation of powers. A more appropriate and pragmatic
approach would have left more discretion to the agency to deny review in
SAS while allowing courts to review ultra vires agency action in Cuozzo
and Thyrv. In Cuozzo, the Court should have found that judicial review
of the PTO institution decision was appropriate, although the outcome of
that case—that it was not an error for the PTAB to consider claims that
were only implicitly challenged by the petition—may have turned out the
same. In SAS, the Court should have declined to review the PTO’s practice of partial institution denials. And in Thryv, the Court should have
reviewed the PTAB’s ruling that the petition was not time-barred.
V. EVALUATING THE HECKLER APPROACH
A. PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES
The Heckler approach of distinguishing agency action and inaction in
IPR institution decisions has a variety of practical advantages. First, it
avoids the artificial distinction between institution and final written decisions drawn by Thryv. As the SAS and Windy City decisions plainly
demonstrated, that dichotomy is easily manipulated (by the agency and
the courts) and has little to do with procedural realities.192 This leads to
unpredictable, results-oriented decisions. Although the action/inaction
paradigm may be harder to distinguish in other administrative law contexts,193 that is not the case here. Judicial review is only appropriate
under the Heckler approach if (and only to the extent that) an IPR is
instituted.194
Second, allowing the PTO the freedom to not institute parts of a petition would mean it no longer needs to deny large numbers of petitions on
procedural grounds to conserve resources, as it has after SAS.195
Third, the Heckler approach, especially the increased discretion for the
PTO to deny review, provides for a better balance of institutional interests between individuals, courts, and the agency.196 Denial of review,
where the agency would get most discretion, has the least impact on indi191. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2153 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. See supra Part III; see also notes 91–99 and accompanying text.
193. See infra Section V.B.3.
194. I.e., only claims that are instituted should be reviewable.
195. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139–40; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 78,
at 52; Brief for the Federal Respondent at 35, SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348
(2018) (No. 16-969), 2017 WL 3948437 (“Granting review of claims that the agency believes have no reasonable likelihood of being invalidated would . . . force the USPTO and
the parties to spend time and energy on claims that are unlikely to be affected [in an
IPR].”).
196. Harvey Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of “Committed to
Agency Discretion,” 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 371 (1968) (detailing weighing of institutional
interests).
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vidual parties. Patent owners would not have their patent rights affected,
and patent challengers would still have the district courts as an alternative
forum for the challenge. As for the balance between the agency and the
courts, the agency would be able to focus resources on the most promising parts of a petition (a task in which it has more expertise than
courts).197 And the Federal Circuit would not have to waste resources
reviewing portions of PTO decisions that the agency thought had weak
arguments for institution in the first place.198
Finally, the approach is more likely to satisfy both wings of the Court
than the institution trio by providing more avenues of judicial review of
statutory language (to satisfy the Gorsuch wing) while still deferring to
agency expertise (as advocated by the Kagan–Breyer camp).199
The fact that the Court decided to take on another IPR-related case in
2021—United States v. Arthrex200— may indicate that it will continue to
target the PTO in its administrative law battles. Perhaps a focus on more
functional and pragmatic approaches in this area would soften the blow
to the PTO’s day-to-day operations while allowing the courts a proper
role in constraining agency discretion.
B. LIMITATIONS
1. The Merits Threshold
The one major issue that the proposed Heckler approach does not resolve is whether Congress intended courts to review, upon institution of
an IPR, the PTO’s threshold determination that the petitioner had a reasonable likelihood to prevail on at least one of the claims in the petition.201 The APA directs the courts to review only final agency actions,
and thus the preliminary decision by the PTO would only be reviewable
after the final written decision is issued.202
Heckler, to the extent it applies in this action/inaction gray area,203
would seem to cut both ways. On the one hand, there is “a meaningful
standard” for judicial review—the statutory threshold. On the other
hand, such fact-specific, preliminary decisions are best left to the
197. See Matthew G. Sipe, Experts, Generalists, Laypeople—and the Federal Circuit, 32
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 575, 578 (2019) (“[T]he data suggests that the Federal Circuit affirms
findings made by the PTAB reliably more often than findings made by district court
judges . . . .”).
198. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“More than that, to read § 318(a) as requiring a ‘final written decision’ in respect to those
15 perhaps frivolous challenges would seem to lead to judicial review of the Board’s decision about those frivolous challenges.”).
199. See infra Section V.C.
200. 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021).
201. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
202. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (limiting review to final agency decisions); see also Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“The Patent Office’s decision to
initiate inter partes review is ‘preliminary,’ not ‘final.’” (quoting § 704)).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 170–71 (describing applicability of Heckler in
this context).
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agency204 and its superior expertise in such matters.205 In addition, given
that similar decisions were not appealable in related post-grant proceedings,206 it is likely Congress did not intend for this question to be reviewed by the courts.
No matter the ultimate conclusion, however, the point is largely moot.
First, it is rare that the PTAB finds all reviewed claims patentable,207
which would be the only time one would convincingly question its preliminary decision that there was a likelihood of finding at least one of the
claims unpatentable. Second, in that situation, it hardly seems likely that
the patentee would be able to appeal the PTAB’s decision on the ground
that that the IPR should not have been instituted in the first place208;
“[c]ourts of appeals employ a prudential rule that the prevailing party in
a lower tribunal cannot ordinarily seek relief in the appellate court.”209
Moreover, such a litigant would have trouble meeting Article III standing
requirements. Even such a procedural injury, with its relaxed injury and
redressability requirements, still requires a showing that “there is some
possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party
to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”210 But why
waste litigation resources just to have the PTAB admit it should not have
instituted the IPR in the first place? Such fact-specific inquiries hardly
make favorable new law. And the patentee does not stand to personally
benefit from such an admission as none of the claims had ultimately been
disturbed. In fact, a favorable final written decision by the PTAB may
actually benefit the patentee in any parallel district court litigation.
In all, this potential ambivalence of the Heckler approach with regard
to review of the merits threshold issue is irrelevant in practice.
204. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Individual, isolated nonenforcement decisions, however, must be made by hundreds of agencies
each day. It is entirely permissible to presume that Congress has not intended courts to
review such mundane matters, absent either some indication of congressional intent to the
contrary . . . .”).
205. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) and not (a)(1) in arguing that “the agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent
Office’s discretion”).
206. See supra Section I.A.2.
207. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 13, at 14 (showing that only 6% of
final written decisions find all claims to have been patentable).
208. And, the petitioner cannot possibly appeal this decision as it requested institution
and argued for it.
209. SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. DECA Int’l Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(first citing Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333–34 (1980); and then
citing Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 702–04 (2011)).
210. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (first citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992); and then citing Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v.
Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555
U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest
that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create
Article III standing.”); U.S. Inventor, Inc. v. Hirshfeld, No. 2:21-CV-00047-JRG, 2021 WL
2936385, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 13, 2021) (“In the case of a discretionary denial, there is no
harm to patentees because the proceeding ends and the patent rights are unaffected; the
status quo is maintained.”).
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2. Criticisms of Heckler
The Heckler decision and specifically its emphasis on the action/inaction dichotomy has been criticized as being arbitrary and difficult to reconcile with modern administrative law doctrine. The general argument is
that agency inaction, in the modern administrative state of pervasive regulation, is still technically an action by the agency that affects regulated
parties and amends regulatory schemes.211
Yet the difference between action and inaction, though potentially
tricky in other contexts, is not as difficult to distinguish in the PTO institution context.212 Granting review is an agency action, and denial of review is an agency inaction. And even the critics admit that Heckler
correctly identified a critical difference between agency action and inaction: the Executive Branch’s prerogative and superior ability to make resource allocation decisions for agencies.213 In fact, one scholar has
praised Heckler for its “decidedly functional approach” that attempted to
ameliorate earlier, more formalistic approaches to unreviewability of
agency decisions.214
Other criticisms of Heckler argue that the lack of judicial review of
agency inaction can lead to abuse.215 Yet Heckler reasons that “[t]he danger that agencies may not carry out their delegated powers with sufficient
vigor does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts are the most
appropriate body to police this aspect of their performance.”216 Moreover, the concerns of agency abuse in refusing enforcement are dampened
in the IPR context because there is still an alternative recourse for patent
challengers—district court litigation.
In general, although courts of appeals have chosen not to read Heckler
broadly and to create a variety of exceptions to the doctrine,217 there are
still important insights that can be borrowed from that decision. And a
211. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157,
179–80 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction after Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 653, 667 (1985) (“[B]oth action and inaction amount to decisions . . . . [A]
failure to act might be seen as . . . a ‘subsidy’ to those who benefited from the inaction.”
(quoting West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937))).
212. See supra Section I.A.
213. Bhagwat, supra note 211, at 182 (“[N]onenforcement decisions tend to involve a
complex balancing of many factors, including the likelihood of success in litigation and
whether agency resources are better spent elsewhere, which courts are not well placed to
review.”); Sunstein, supra note 211, at 672–73.
214. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 689, 712 (1990) (“The Court subtly undermined the ‘law to apply’ formalism . . . .”
(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 (1971))).
215. See Bressman, supra note 52, at 1686 (“[A]n agency is subject to improper influences when it refuses to act, just as when it decides to act. Thus, courts committed to
combatting such improper influences should do so however they are manifested, whether
as inaction or action.”); Sunstein, supra note 211, at 675–83 (arguing that courts should
entertain challenges to nonenforcement decisions that indicate a pattern of abuse by the
agency).
216. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834 (1985).
217. BREYER ET AL., supra note 164, at 807.
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Supreme Court that is generally more skeptical of agency action218 may
be receptive to how the case is applied in the PTO institution context—
and perhaps beyond.219
3. When an Agency Goes Too Far: The Fintiv Conundrum
Scholars may wonder how the Heckler approach could address a recent
PTO trend of increasingly using procedural discretion to deny institution.
The PTAB’s use of a multifactor test announced in a precedential 2020
PTAB decision, Apple Inc. v. Fintiv Inc.,220 to deny review has “exploded.”221 Practitioners complain that this decision has “create[d] significant blackout zones in which it will not be possible for a litigation
defendant to use PTAB review.”222
Although Fintiv set out a number of factors to consider in granting or
denying review, the one factor that appears to cause the most denials is
“whether a district court [in parallel litigation] has scheduled trial for a
date before the PTAB would issue a final written decision [on the same
patent].”223 It appears that neither the “petitioner’s diligence” in seeking
review, the lack of overlap in issues between the IPR and the district
court proceeding, nor the merits of the petition can necessarily rescue a
petitioner from this procedural pitfall.224 As a consequence, patentees
can foreclose a challenger’s option of an IPR if they file in districts that
set early trial dates.225 In fact, one district court judge has expressly “indicated that he sets early trial dates” to foreclose PTAB review of
patents.226
The Fintiv conundrum demonstrates a critical problem created by the
institution trio. In sapping the resources of the PTO by forcing it to review all claims in each petition, while providing a legal loophole of unbridled discretion in denying review, the PTO has been cornered into using
shortcuts to save time on the front end. Fintiv is a symptom of this illness.
Although application of the current Heckler approach may have prevented this problem, it is more difficult to apply it to force the PTO to
reform its current ways. Under the Heckler approach, the PTO is in the
best position to make resource allocation decisions. Moreover, there
seems to be little statutory guidance from Congress about what consider218. Metzger, supra note 55, at 67 (“A striking characteristic of many Roberts Court
administrative law opinions is their sharp rhetorical attack on the administrative state and
bureaucracy.”).
219. See infra Section V.C.
220. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv Inc., No. IPR2020–00019, 2020 WL 2126495, at *2 (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 20, 2020).
221. Joseph Matal, Mapping the Contours of PTAB Discretionary Denials in 2020, LAW
360 (Dec. 15, 2020, 5:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1335699/mapping-the-contours-of-ptab-discretionary-denials-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/3TPN-NPSZ].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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ations the PTO may use in denying review. Congress mentioned that, in
passing regulations related to IPR proceedings, the PTO “shall consider
the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the integrity of the
patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of
the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted.”227 Although there
may be arguments that the Fintiv denials hurt the integrity of the patent
system by denying review to meritorious petitions, they also likely help
the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted. And, there is no
evidence that the PTO has failed to consider these factors in the Fintiv
decision.
There may also be an argument that these congressional considerations
should not apply to Fintiv denials at all because the PTO published this
policy in a precedential adjudicative decision, not through rulemaking.
But the general requirement for rational decision-making by agencies
likely blurs this procedural distinction.228
It is true that Heckler provided some escape hatches where judicial review of agency inaction may be appropriate, including when an agency
“‘consciously and expressly adopt[s] a general policy’ that is so extreme
as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”229 But the
Fintiv denials hardly fit this framing. Had the PTO deliberately denied
review to benefit certain patent owners230 or completely stopped instituting IPRs,231 there may be something for the Court to sink its teeth into.
But general allegations of arbitrary decision-making would likely not provide sufficient standards for courts to review.232 After all, “if no judicially
manageable standards are available for judging how and when an agency
should exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate agency action for ‘abuse of discretion.’”233
Unfortunately, Heckler provides no easy answers here. The courts may
not be the best place to resolve this conflict. Congress may have recently
taken the hint, however: “Vermont Sen. Patrick Leahy . . . announced a
227. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).
228. Bhagwat, supra note 211, at 182 (“[SEC v. Chenery Corp.] permits courts to review
both the rationality of an agency’s stated reasons for declining to enforce, and the consistency of the current inaction with past behavior and stated policy, but otherwise to defer to
agencies on the specific choices they make.” (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94
(1943)).
229. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
230. Id. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is possible to imagine other nonenforcement decisions made for entirely illegitimate reasons, for example, nonenforcement in return for a bribe, judicial review of which would not be foreclosed by the nonreviewability
presumption.”).
231. Sunstein, supra note 211, at 670 (“But there is a distinction between exercising
such discretion and refusing to carry out obligations that Congress has imposed on the
executive.”); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016)
(“[N]or does our interpretation enable the agency to act outside its statutory limits . . . .”).
232. Sunstein, supra note 211, at 682 (“An allegation that an agency has acted arbitrarily because it has failed to take action against a particular violation of the governing statute
presents the weakest claim for reviewability.”).
233. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
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bill that would abolish the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s controversial
power to deny [IPR] petitions for reasons other than the merits of the
case . . . .”234
C. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
The Heckler opinion may provide a clue as to how the divided Supreme
Court can potentially reach a more predictable consensus on judicial review of agency action in other contexts beyond the agency action/inaction
dichotomy. Although there is still some uncertainty, clear trends in the
administrative law context are already emerging in the Court’s recent jurisprudence. The new conservative majority on the Court—including the
Gorsuch-led anti-administrative faction—appears much more skeptical of
deferring to administrative law constructions of statutory language.235
Several conservative members of the Court also staunchly defend the importance of judicial review of agency action at seemingly all costs.236 In
addition, the conservative majority has often put greater emphasis on
preserving the separation of powers and the respective roles of each
branch of government.237 Along with this trend, more weight has been
placed on accountability and chain of command within the agency and
the Executive Branch.238
At first glance, Heckler’s functional approach—looking beyond the
text of an agency’s enabling statute—might seem too extreme for the conservative Justices.239 But Heckler’s consideration of institutional competence and separation of powers provides more avenues for judicial review
of agency action, potentially satisfying the new conservative majority in
general, and maybe even the more anti-administrative fringe led by Justice Gorsuch. Even with the pragmatic considerations in Heckler, the
234. Dani Kass, Sen. Leahy Aims to Override PTAB’s Fintiv Rule in New Bill, LAW 360
(Sept. 22, 2021, 4:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1424079/sen-leahy-aims-to-override-ptab-s-fintiv-rule-in-new-bill [https://perma.cc/N96T-9VGZ].
235. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE
L.J. 931, 934 (2021) (“At a minimum, the Justices seem more willing to find clarity using
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, thereby avoiding Chevron deference
altogether.”).
236. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing, with Roberts joining, that judges and not
agencies should be the only ones invalidating issued patents); Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2150
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defending, with Sotomayor, the
“‘strong presumption’ favoring judicial review of administrative action.” (quoting Mach
Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015))).
237. See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020)
(conservative majority emphasizing “constitutional structure” and “separation of powers”
in holding an agency appointment unconstitutional).
238. Id. at 2203 (“The CFPB’s single-Director structure contravenes this carefully calibrated system by vesting significant governmental power in the hands of a single individual
accountable to no one.”); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (2021) (emphasizing “[t]he chain of command” within the PTO).
239. Metzger, supra note 55, at 48 (“[Recently] conservatives [have] often [been] taking
a more formalist view and the liberals being more nonformalist and specifically functionalist in orientation.”); id. at 54 (“The Roberts Court is often described as textualist in its
approach to statutory interpretation, including by the Justices themselves.”).
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courts, and not the agency, may often have the last word in construing
relevant statutory language.240 And the deference that agency discretion
may receive in certain circumstances under a more functional approach
may still be palatable to the conservative majority on separation of powers grounds, as respecting the Executive Branch’s priority-setting prerogative. In addition, deference to agency discretion does not necessarily
undermine accountability within the agency.241
As for the deferential faction of the Supreme Court that appears to still
have significant influence over the Court’s more moderate Justices, it may
be placated by Heckler’s emphasis on pragmatic considerations such as
the agency’s expertise in reviewing agency action.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s institution trio of cases has left a mess in its
wake. Courts must now jump through artificial hoops designed by the
resulting framework in order to review novel legal questions on the scope
of PTO statutory authority in instituting review of IPRs. And the agency
is forced to needlessly review frivolous grounds in institution petitions
instead of using its expertise to weed them out early and focus its resources elsewhere.
The reasoning in Heckler can provide a more functional and pragmatic
approach in this instance. Had the Court considered congressional intent,
comparative institutional competence, and the separation of powers in its
institution trio decisions, it would have concluded that judicial review
should only be precluded for agency inaction—for example, the denial of
IPR institution.
With this new approach, the PTO and the courts can go back to doing
their jobs. The PTO can decide whether and to what extent to deny institution of an IPR in view of scarce resources and its unique expertise. And
the courts can still review the PTO’s adherence to statutory requirements
if the PTO institutes review. The agency would no longer be forced to
look for shortcuts to deny large numbers of petitions, and the courts
would be able to focus on the novel legal questions presented upon
institution.
Moreover, Heckler’s more functional approach to agency action may,
in other contexts and even beyond the action/inaction dichotomy, provide
a potential compromise that satisfies both sides of the ideological divide
in the Court.

240. For example, in the IPR context, the approach opens up more avenues for judicial
review of IPR institution decisions, including the one-year bar. The minority of conservative Justices that view patents as a private right would also be comforted by the availability
of judicial review before such rights are invalidated. See supra note 236 and text
accompanying.
241. In the IPR context, because institution is the statutory responsibility of the Director, there should be no internal accountability issues with providing the Director discretion
in denying review.

